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Abstract 
Balanced budget requirements lead to substantial pro-cyclicality in state government 
spending outside of safety-net programs.  At the beginnings of recessions, states tend to 
experience unexpected deficits.  While all states ultimately pay these deficits down, 
differences in the stringency of their balanced budget requirements dictate the pace at 
which they adjust.  States with strict rules enact large rescissions to their budgets during 
the years in which adverse shocks occur; states with weak rules make up the difference 
during the following years.  We use this variation to identify the impact of mid-year 
budget cuts on state income and employment.  Our baseline estimates imply i) a state-
spending multiplier of 1.7 and ii) that avoiding $25,000 in mid-year cuts preserves one 
job.  These cuts are associated with shifts in the timing of government expenditures rather 
than differences in total spending over the course of the business cycle.  Consequently, 
our results are informative about the potential gains from smoothing the path of state 
government spending.  They imply that states could reduce the amplitude of business-
cycle fluctuations by 15% if they completely smoothed their capital spending and service 
provision outside of safety-net programs. 
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1. Introduction  
Recent economic conditions have generated renewed interest in Keynesian fiscal 
policy.  Interest among economists has been driven in part by resurgence in government 
use of active fiscal policy, embodied most tangibly by the passage of the $787 billion 
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) in February of 2009.  In broader 
context, however, the ARRA is only the most recent episode in a trend that includes the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, and the ARRA’s most immediate predecessor, the 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.   
State governments, whose spending accounts for about 10% of GDP, play a major 
role in the fiscal policy landscape.  Since almost all US states have formal balanced 
budget requirements, a large share of state spending fluctuates pro-cyclically.  When 
states enter recessions, their tax bases contract and their safety-net expenditures expand.  
Consequently, compliance with balanced budget requirements typically entails significant 
reductions in capital expenditures and in spending on services including education, 
corrections, and health.
2
  We illustrate the substantial pro-cyclicality of these 
expenditures in Figures 1 and 2, which we constructed using flexibly de-trended data on 
personal income and the relevant categories of government spending.
3
  Figure 1 plots the 
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 In this context, safety-net programs primarily include Unemployment Insurance (UI), cash welfare 
assistance, and Medicaid.  Spending out of insurance trusts, which includes state UI programs, is not 
subject to state balanced budget requirements.  Other insurance trust spending is dominated by pension 
plans for public employees.  Non safety-net spending primarily involves spending on education, 
transportation, health, law enforcement (including corrections), and relatively minor categories including 
spending on utilities and public parks. 
3
 Specifically, we regressed both non safety-net spending and personal income on state-specific quartic 
trends.  Altering the number of terms in the polynomial does not significantly change the results, although a 
relatively flexible polynomial seems clearly preferable to a simple linear trend given the variety of changes 
a state’s economic trajectory can make over the course of five decades. 
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means of these de-trended series across states from 1960-2006, while Figure 2 displays 
each state-year observation for the two series in scatter plot form.  The best-fit line shows 
that when personal income is $1 below trend, non safety-net spending tends to be 8.9 
cents below trend (with a standard error of 1.4 cents).  Notably, roughly $250 billion was 
initially allocated by the ARRA for state and local governments with the express intent 
that they would not have to reduce such spending to comply with their balanced budget 
requirements (Government Accountability Office, 2009).
4
  Our empirical work 
investigates the effects of the budget cuts these dollars aimed to prevent.
5
 
Prior empirical work on fiscal policy has typically involved Structural Vector 
Autoregressions (SVARs),
6
 from which both inference and extrapolation can be difficult 
(see, e.g., the discussion in Auerbach and Gale, 2009).   Difficulties with inference based 
on SVAR studies relate to their source of identification.  Such studies rely on the 
completeness of model specification for identification, giving identification a different 
meaning than that typically intended in empirical microeconomic studies.  An 
examination of the time series for aggregate government spending quickly reveals that 
SVAR estimates will be based almost exclusively on shocks to defense spending, with 
the unexpected component coming largely from the World War II and Korean War build-
ups (Ramey, 2009).  Such spending makes inference difficult for two reasons.  First, wars 
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 GAO (2009) notes that among the funds disbursed through September 2009, approximately 62% was 
intended as support for state’s Medicaid programs while 27% was meant for education and training.  Since 
these funds did not exceed the amounts states would otherwise have spent on these programs, however, the 
additional federal funds amount to general budgetary support. 
5
 Importantly, however, the natural experiment we study involves a smoothing of state government 
expenditures over the business cycle rather than the net increase in total expenditures made possible by 
federal aid in the form of grants.  Our results speak more directly to the potential effects of federal loans 
that must be repaid during better economic times. 
6
 Recent examples include Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2009), Ramey (2008) and Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009). 
 4 
can be associated with other important shifts in economic policy.
7
  Second, the onset and 
resolution of wars may have significant impacts on expectations for future tax and 
income streams, both being important determinants of current consumption behavior.   
The difficulties with extrapolation from SVAR studies also relate to their reliance 
on defense spending.  There are important differences between defense spending and the 
kinds of spending typically considered for stimulus purposes.  Unlike defense spending, 
spending on infrastructure, health, and education may directly affect the economy’s 
production possibilities by adding to physical and human capital.  Spending on programs 
like Medicaid and UI will involve incentive effects that influence labor supply and hence 
the level of output associated with full employment in the long run.  Finally, some war-
related spending goes to wages for soldiers overseas, making it difficult for such 
spending to generate multiplier effects through subsequent consumption of US goods and 
services.  In contrast, the budget cuts we study involve programs that have been and will 
be directly affected by past and future fiscal stimulus packages.  
Our methodology involves exploiting a plausibly exogenous source of state-level 
variation for identification.  Our strategy draws upon and extends previous work (in 
particular Poterba, 1994) on the effect of states’ balanced budget requirements on their 
fiscal behavior.  States have varying degrees of stringency built into the rules which 
govern the debt finance of general fund expenditures.  During times of fiscal stress, states 
with relatively strict rules enact relatively large rescissions to their budgets in order to 
quickly narrow emerging budget deficits.  Conditioning upon the size of the fiscal shock, 
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 During World War II, for example, the US economy underwent the imposition of rationing and price 
controls. 
 5 
we use the spending cuts made by strict-rule states (in excess of those made by weak-rule 
states) to identify the effects of these budget cuts on state economic outcomes. 
Having voiced concerns with the methods employed in past work, we would be 
remiss to not highlight problems with our own.  First, as is common in much of the fiscal 
policy literature, precision is relatively low.  We present our best reading of the available 
data and show that our results are robust to basic specification checks.  We acknowledge, 
however, that our setting is one in which results change non-trivially with sufficient 
adjustment to the sample and specification.  Second, we cannot fully rule out a potentially 
important threat to our identification strategy.  Specifically, states with weak balanced 
budget rules rely somewhat more extensively than others on personal income taxation as 
a source of revenue.  This has implications for our measure of deficit shocks which, for 
reasons elaborated below, could upwardly bias our estimates.  These limitations suggest 
that further methodological innovations are needed to consolidate our knowledge of state 
governments’ effects on the business cycle.  
To summarize our results, we estimate i) a state-spending multiplier of around 1.7 
and ii) that avoiding around $25,000 in cuts yields one job.  A breakdown of the 
employment result between private and public establishments suggests that almost all of 
the jobs appear in the private sector, with public sector workers gaining moderately in the 
form of higher wages and salaries.  Since a significant portion of state fiscal adjustment 
comes through deferred capital projects, much of this private employment may involve 
government contractors.  The estimate of the state-spending multiplier is not very precise 
(e.g., a standard error of 0.93), while the estimate of the dollars-per-job figure is 
somewhat more so (e.g., a standard error of around $11,000).  The potential upward bias 
 6 
noted above, along with evidence from robustness checks, suggests that our best estimate 
of the multiplier might be moderately below 1.7.   
Our results do not apply to pure increases in government spending, but rather to 
shifts in its timing.  Both weak- and strict-rule states ultimately adjust their budgets 
during downturns to pay off the unexpected deficits associated with fiscal crises.  Our 
estimates pick up the relatively fast declines in personal income and employment 
associated with the relatively fast adjustments made by the states with strict budget rules.  
The results have implications for the extent to which business-cycle fluctuations could be 
lessened by smoothing the path of state government expenditures.  We arrive at the 
relevant estimate by coupling our multiplier estimate with our estimate that spending 
tends to be 8.9 cents below trend when personal income is $1 below trend.  The product 
of these estimates implies that the amplitude of state business cycles could be reduced by 
about 15% (1.7 x 0.089) if states completely smoothed their non safety-net expenditures. 
Our employment evidence suggests a much lower dollars-per-job figure than that 
associated with general discussions of stimulus spending.  This is at least in part due to 
the kind of spending we study.  We study the effects of rescissions to pre-existing 
programs.  Stimulus spending, on the other hand, often involves projects that have not 
begun or been fully planned.  Additionally, the recent federal stimulus includes 
significant support for state Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Medicaid programs.  
These programs play important roles with respect to distributional and safety-net 
concerns, but may actually reduce employment on net due to their incentive effects.  
Further considerations highlight that dollars-per-job may serve better as a political metric 
than welfare metric.  Job-creation programs significantly benefit those who obtain new 
 7 
jobs, while providing no benefit for those who remain unemployed.  Conversely, safety-
net spending should tend to diffuse across those hit hardest by a downturn. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 illustrates our strategy for utilizing 
state-level variation to identify the impact of mid-year budget cuts on economic 
outcomes.   Section 3 provides additional background regarding state balanced budget 
rules and our measure of deficit shocks.  Section 4 presents the econometric model and 
describes the relevant data.  Section 5 presents results and section 6 concludes. 
2. An illustration of the estimation strategy 
The following example illustrates our identification strategy.  1991 was a year of 
severe fiscal stress for the states.  By our measure of fiscal shocks (adopted from Poterba, 
1994, and discussed in the next section), Michigan and Mississippi experienced similar 
surprise deficits on the order of $150 per capita.  Mississippi has a statutory requirement 
which prevents the government from carrying a general fund deficit through the end of a 
fiscal year (unless it takes actions to override the statute), making it a "strong-rule state" 
by our classification system.  It cut spending aggressively in response to this shock, 
enacting rescissions amounting to $46 per capita.
8
  Michigan, on the other hand, only 
requires unexpected deficits to be closed in the budget for the following fiscal year.  This 
requirement has no bite in terms of the state’s behavior in the year during which the 
shock occurs, making Michigan a "weak-rule state" by our classification system.  As one 
would expect, Michigan cut spending less aggressively than Mississippi, enacting 
rescissions which amounted to $15 per capita. 
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 Mississippi also reported taking actions including a hiring freeze, a travel freeze, layoffs, furloughs, and 
dipping into its rainy day fund during the recession (NASBO, Fiscal Survey of the States: October 1991). 
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When we partial out fixed effects and trends (upon which we condition in our 
regression analysis), we find that Mississippi had an income gap of $54 per person, while 
Michigan was $2 per person above its trend.  Dividing this difference by the difference in 
their fiscal policies yields a multiplier estimate of 56/31 ≈ 1.8, similar to the results of our 
preferred specification.  We construct similarly motivated estimates for the impact of 
fiscal policy on state employment.  
The calculation in this example was simplified by the fact that Michigan and 
Mississippi had similarly sized fiscal shocks in 1991.  In general this is not the case, 
making it essential for us to control for the main effect of the fiscal shock.  One can at 
this point get a sense for the key identification assumption behind our estimation strategy.  
It is essential that a measured deficit shock in a weak-rule state carries the same 
economic content with respect to income and employment as a measured deficit shock in 
a strong-rule state.  If a measured shock of $150 per capita would (in the absence of state 
fiscal policy) be associated with a lower level of personal income (relative to trend) in a 
strong-rule state than in a weak-rule state, then our estimate of the multiplier would be 
biased upward.  We would attribute too much of the strong-rule state’s low level of 
personal income to its relatively aggressive budget rescissions.    
The assumption that measured deficit shocks have the same economic content in 
weak- and strong-rule states corresponds to the exclusion restriction for our instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation strategy.  We cannot explicitly test this restriction.  In the text 
below, we consider potential sources of concern.  Note that it does not matter if weak-
rule states differ from strong-rule states along some fixed (or, for that matter, linearly 
trending) dimension.  Since we have panel variation in our instrument, we always control 
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for state fixed effects and trends.  We typically make these controls specific to the 
episodes of fiscal stress in our dataset (i.e., the episodes surrounding the early 1990s and 
early 2000s recessions).  These controls are important for the purposes of achieving both 
identification and precision.  With their inclusion, differences between strong- and weak-
rule states will only bias our estimates if they impact the economic content of our 
measure of deficit shocks. 
3. Budget rules and deficit shocks 
Budget rules 
State balanced budget requirements play a central role in our identification 
strategy.  Following the literature, we collect information on these requirements from a 
1987 report by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and 
from various reports by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO).   
All states save Vermont have a formal balanced budget rule of one form or 
another.  These rules vary substantially across states in terms of their stringency.  For 
instance, some states require the governor to submit a balanced budget, the legislature to 
pass a balanced budget, or the governor to sign a balanced budget.  This first set of rules 
applies solely to the enactment of the budget.  We would not expect these rules to impact 
states’ responses to deficits that emerge over the course of the fiscal year.  The strictest 
rule (also known as the “no-carry” rule) prohibits carrying deficits through the next 
budget cycle altogether.  This rule applies directly to the execution of the budget and 
would be expected to exert influence on states’ behavior during the year in which the 
deficit emerges.   
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Rules can also differ in terms of how difficult it is for the government to override 
them.  When the rules appear in statutes, they can be overridden by a simple majority 
vote.  When they appear in the state constitution, on the other hand, a supermajority or 
statewide referendum may be required.  This adds an additional dimension along which 
rules can be regarded as weak or strong. 
Past studies of fiscal institutions have explored some of the consequences of these 
rules.  Highlights include studies by Poterba (1997) and Bohn and Inman (1996), who 
examine the impact of different requirements on a broad range of budgetary outcomes, as 
well as Poterba and Reuben (2001) and Lowry and Alt (2001), whose work addresses the 
nexus between balanced budget requirements, state fiscal behavior, and interest rates on 
general-obligation debt.  These studies find that requirements which apply to the budget’s 
execution have greater impact than those that apply only to the budget’s enactment.  In 
particular, a rule requiring states to pay off unexpected deficits within the next fiscal year 
(the “no-carry” rule) drives relatively fast returns to fiscal balance following adverse 
shocks. 
This paper links most directly to work by Poterba (1994).  Using data available in 
semi-annual reports by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), 
Poterba constructs a measure of fiscal shocks which a) is driven by differences between 
budget forecasts and realizations and b) accounts for the budget adjustments made by 
states over the course of the fiscal year.  He then shows that states take significant mid-
year actions, in the form of spending rescissions and tax increases, to close unexpected 
budget deficits.  States with relatively strict balanced budget requirements (primarily 
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those with the No-Carry rule) enact significantly larger budget cuts than those without 
per dollar of fiscal shock.   
There is enough variation in the effects of strong and weak budget rules to 
generate a reasonably powerful first stage.  Using a standard approach from this 
literature, we divide states into weak-and strong-rule states (or weak-, medium-, and 
strong-rule states) using a stringency index provided by the ACIR (1987).  Following 
Poterba (1994), our baseline regressions use the ACIR index to divide states into 2 
categories of stringency, namely weak and strong.  While Poterba designated states with 
scores greater than 5 as “strong-rule” states, we use a cutoff of 7 since there are relatively 
few states with scores less than or equal to 5.  Our results are not sensitive either to this 
cut-off or to the division of states into strong, medium, and weak designations.  We save 
a more detailed discussion of the breakdown of states across categories for our 
presentation of summary statistics in Section 4.
9
   
Deficit shocks 
Again following Poterba (1994), we quantify fiscal crises by the difference 
between forecasted and actual budgets: 
Expenditure Shockt = OutlayCL,t – Et-1(Outlayst) 
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 In addition to the ACIR and NASBO classifications of budget rules, a classification can also be found in a 
1993 report by GAO.  Differences between these classification systems are the subject of an exchange 
between Levinson (1998, 2007) and Krol and Svorny (2006).  Our examination of the GAO report raises 
the possibility that four of our weak-rule states could be reclassified as strong-rule states.  However, in the 
relevant table of the GAO report, each of these states are linked to a footnote which says “Although these 
states require year-end budget balance, carryover and/or borrowing to finance a deficit are allowed if 
necessary.”  The note implies that the requirement does not bind these states in any serious way, making us 
comfortable maintaining their “weak rule” classification.  There are two additional states which are 
classified as weak-rule states by GAO and as strong-rule states by ACIR.  Changing the classification of 
these two states (Iowa and Delaware) has little impact on our baseline results.   
 12 
Revenue Shockt = RevenueCL,t – Et-1(Revenuest). 
The terms involving expectations are outlay and revenue forecasts, where the forecast is 
made at the end of the previous fiscal year.  OutlayCL,t and RevenueCL,t are the constant-
law levels of outlays and revenues: what would have prevailed in the absence of mid-year 
adjustments to the budget.  The difference between these terms provides a true measure 
of expenditure and revenue shocks.  We cannot directly observe constant-law outlays and 
revenues.  However, we can recover them by subtracting mid-year changes (denoted as 
∆Outlayst  and ∆Revenuet) from the final outlay and revenue outcomes  for the fiscal year 
(Outlayst  and Revenuet).  We then combine the revenue and expenditure shocks to form: 
Deficit Shockt = Expenditure Shockt – Revenue Shockt. 
NASBO reports all the information required to construct these shocks in its semi-annual 
Fiscal Survey of the States series. 
The validity of our research design depends in large part on the economic content 
of our measure of deficit shocks.  Concerns may stem from the fact that measured deficit 
shocks result from forecasting errors.  This raises two possible interpretations of the 
measured shocks.  The first interpretation is that deficit shocks result from worse-than-
expected economic environments in which expenditures on programs like Medicaid are 
larger, and the tax base smaller, than anticipated.  In this scenario we would expect mid-
year budget cuts to represent real cuts in spending. 
The second interpretation is that measured deficit shocks result from bad 
forecasting.  Forecasts might be skewed intentionally for political purposes, or just hastily 
done.  In this scenario, our measured cuts might be more imaginary than real since they 
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would be relative to an unrealistic baseline.   This could lead us to identify the effects of 
accounting gimmicks (or errors) rather than actual reductions in spending. 
Several pieces of evidence make it reasonable to accept the first interpretation.  
First, the mean deficit shock over the 1988-2004 period is $0.07 per capita, with a 
standard deviation of $91.70, suggesting these are truly mean-zero shocks.  Second, as 
we demonstrate in a moment, positive deficit shocks are associated with downturns in 
personal income relative to its trend.  Third, using more comprehensive budget data from 
the Census of Governments,
10
 we have confirmed that a dollar of rescissions isolated by 
our instruments corresponds to a dollar less in state spending outside of insurance trusts 
and public welfare programs.  Fourth, our baseline estimates change little when we 
replace the reported revenue and expenditure forecasts with simple econometric forecasts 
of our own.
11
 
On the second point, consider the evidence in Figure 3 and Table 1.   Figure 3 
graphs national means (across the states) of deficit shocks and de-trended personal 
income per capita.  The figure suggests that deficit shocks become large when an 
economy enters a recession; when de-trended personal income turns sharply downward, 
large, positive deficit shocks appear.  We show this statistically in Table 1, which shows 
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 The forecasts and budget outcomes in NASBO’s series Fiscal Survey of States only account for spending 
out of states’ general funds.  This generally excludes spending out of revenue sources that are earmarked 
for specific purposes (as tends to be the case with charges and fees, a category including revenue sources 
like tolls and public university tuition).  The Census of Governments’ annual survey of state government 
finances provides a more comprehensive look at spending across categories.  It does not, however, 
distinguish between earmarked revenue sources and sources destined to the general fund, making it 
impossible to reconstruct estimates of general fund totals from the variables provided.       
11
 The forecasting element may also raise confusion regarding the persistence of the shocks.  Since state 
forecasts incorporate new information about the state of the economy, deficit shocks tend not to be 
persistent.  We have also found no significant difference in the persistence of deficit shocks in weak-rule 
states relative to strong-rule states.   
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results from regressions in which we use deficit shocks to predict changes in personal 
income.
12
  We split the measure of deficit shocks into separate variables for its positive 
and negative values.  This is standard throughout the paper (as well as in the previous 
literature) because balanced budget requirements only have binding implications for 
fiscal behavior when deficit shocks are positive.  The results show that large, positive 
deficit shocks are associated with large downturns in personal income per capita across a 
range of alternative controls for fixed effects and time effects.  It is less clear what 
negative deficit shocks imply about the state of the economy.     
 4. Empirical Strategy 
Specifications 
The following first and second stage regression equations summarize our 
identification strategy.  The strategy involves using the interaction of the deficit shock 
with an indicator for weak budget rules as an excluded instrument.  We run the following 
regressions: 
1
st
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13
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 We use the same sample in these regressions as in the later regressions in the paper.  We explain the 
sample selection process in the following section. 
13
 Results from Poterba (1994), who uses data from 1988-1992, motivate our first stage regressions.  
Poterba clarifies an important point regarding what might look like a simultaneity problem due to the 
appearance of ∆Outlayss,t in the construction of the deficit shock (1994, pp. 809-810).  In fact, a true 
simultaneity problem would result from failing to subtract ∆Outlayss,t.  As Poterba notes, if one did not 
subtract ∆Outlayss,t, the resulting measure of the shock would equal the true measure of the shock plus 
∆Outlayss,t.  Hence regressing ∆Outlayss,t on this incorrect measure would amount to regressing it on itself 
plus a random variable.  Subtracting ∆Outlayss,t yields an estimate of the true shock and eliminates the 
simultaneity problem. 
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2
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In these equations, Ys,t is a state-level economic outcome for state s during fiscal 
year t,  ∆Outlayss,t is the within-fiscal-year spending adjustment, weakBBRs is an 
indicator equal to one if a state has weak balanced budget rules, and Defshocks,t is the 
measure of deficit shocks discussed above.  As noted earlier, we follow the convention of 
including distinct variables for positive and negative valued deficit shocks.  Since budget 
rules are only binding when deficit shocks are positive, failing to distinguish between 
positive and negative deficit shocks would involve a misspecification of the model.  The 
 and  terms represent state and year fixed effects. 
In practice, most specifications will employ state fixed effects and trends that are 
business-cycle specific.  Each business-cycle downturn constitutes a distinct episode of 
fiscal stress.  We view the data set as consisting of two such episodes for each state, the 
first running from 1988-1994 and the second from 2001-2004.  We specify the trend term 
so that it starts at 1 at the beginning of the relevant cycle.  Since the ∆Outlays variable 
tends to be small relative to the size and variance of state level income and employment, 
we need to remove as much variation from Y as we can in order to obtain statistical 
power.  Cycle-specific fixed effects and trends help us remove noise from Y.  We discuss 
our result’s sensitivity to adjustments in this specification in Section 5. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
    A caveat to note is that there may be error in the NASBO measure of budget cuts.  If the reported cuts 
represent only a portion of the real cuts, our results will be biased upward, as they will also capture the 
effects of these unmeasured cuts.  While this is a plausible case of measurement error which should be kept 
in consideration, we have no evidence suggesting that it is pervasive problem. 
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Identification 
Ignoring for a moment that we include positive and negative deficit shocks as 
separate terms, we can write the exclusion (or orthogonality) restriction as follows: 
0. = )*Defshock*E(weakBBR ts,ts,s   
Noting that weakBBRs is binary, we can re-write this condition in two pieces: 
0, = 1)weakBBR|*Defshock*E(weakBBR*
0)weakBBR|*Defshock*E(weakBBR*)-(1
sts,ts,s
sts,ts,sweakBBR




weakBBRp
p
 
where pweakBBR is the probability that a state has weak budget rules.  The first piece of this 
expression automatically equals 0, however, since it is the piece for which weakBBRs 
always equals 0.  Hence we are left with  
0 = 1)weakBBR|*Defshock*E(weakBBR* sts,ts,sweakBBR p  
as our exclusion restriction, with weakBBRs always equal to one.  Now note that since we 
include the main effect of the deficit shock in our regressions, it follows from the 
properties of ordinary least squares that .0)*E(Defshock ts,ts,   Consequently, we have 
that if 1),weakBBR|*E(Defshock)*E(Defshock sts,ts,ts,ts,    the exclusion 
restriction is satisfied.  In words, the restriction is satisfied if the unconditional 
expectation of the deficit shock times the second stage error equals that same expectation 
conditional on a state having weak budget rules.  We draw the interpretation that the 
exclusion restriction requires deficit shocks to have similar economic content in weak- 
and strong-rule states.   
 17 
 The primary threat to this condition stems from differences in the revenue bases 
utilized across states.  States with weak budget rules make greater use of personal income 
taxes than states with strict budget rules.  Personal income taxes tend to be more volatile 
than other revenue sources.  Consequently, an economic shock of a given size may, all 
else equal, result in a relatively large deficit shock in the weak-rule states.  If true, this 
would upwardly bias our multiplier estimates.  Conditional on their deficit shocks, weak-
rule states would have better performing economies than strong-rule states for reasons 
unrelated to their budget cuts.  We return to this point when presenting summary statistics 
on state government budgets and economies.  
Sample Inclusion Criteria 
We implement our regressions on the sample of states used by Poterba (1994).  
The sample excludes biennially-budgeting states for two reasons.  First, the implications 
of budget rules for the timing of fiscal adjustments are less clear in biennial states than in 
annual states.  Second, for biennial states the NASBO reports leave uncertainty regarding 
the years in which forecasts were made and in which budget cuts were implemented.  
Inclusion of the biennially-budgeting states reduces first stage precision, raising statistical 
concerns regarding the extent to which our instruments satisfy the relevance criterion.
14
  
The sample also excludes Alaska, due to the uniquely prominent role of oil revenues in 
its finances, and Massachusetts, which engaged in budgetary shenanigans such that its 
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 When the biennial states are included in our baseline specification, the F-statistic on the joint test for 
significance of the excluded instruments is 5.17, which raises serious concerns about bias in both the 
coefficient and standard error estimates.  Second stage results are in the same ballpark as the estimates in 
our preferred specification but have larger standard errors, particularly in the employment regression.  
GAO (1993) provides a classification of states that breaks biennial budgeting states into those that have 
annual and biennial legislative cycles.  Adding the biennial budgeting states with annual legislative cycles 
to our sample does not substantially change our results.  We report these results later while discussing 
robustness checks.  
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definition of mid-year rescissions differs from that of other states.
15
  This leaves a sample 
of 27 annually budgeting states. 
Data and Summary statistics 
As noted earlier, we generate our measure of budget rules using a 1 to 10 index 
produced by the ACIR (1987).  Using a cutoff of 7, there are 14 states with weak rules 
and 36 states with strong rules.  Our sample of 27 annually budgeting states contains 8 
states with weak rules, and 19 with strong rules.  We also present results with the rules 
divided into 3 categories, with 19 states having strong rules, 4 medium, and 4 weak.  
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the states in each classification.
16
   
Table 3 presents summary statistics for various demographic, economic, and 
fiscal characteristics across states.  We constructed the demographic characteristics by 
tabulating individual level data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS) database for the Current Population Survey (CPS).  We constructed the 
personal income variable using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and 
the employment variables using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  Finally, 
fiscal characteristics come from semi-annual reports by NASBO and from the Census of 
Government’s Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances. 
Note that we estimate the impact of fiscal policy on personal income rather than 
GSP (the state equivalent of GDP).  Most states begin their fiscal years in July.  This 
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 This is quite explicit in the note for the Massachusetts entry in the 1988 NASBO report, raising concerns 
about the Massachusetts series for the length of the sample. 
16
 Later, in Table 13, we present results where we include states that have biennial budget cycles but annual 
legislative cycles, changing the pool of weak- vs. strong-rule states; the results are very similar to our 
baseline specification. 
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makes it necessary to use variables that are reported at either a monthly or quarterly 
frequency.  The BEA’s state-level personal income series fits this description, while its 
GSP series does not.
17
   
Our sample runs from 1988-2004.  NASBO reports did not include the mid-year 
adjustments needed to construct deficit shocks until 1988.  We view the sample as 
consisting of two periods of fiscal stress, namely 1988-1994 and 2001-2004.   In general 
we omit 1995-2000 because this is a boom period, resulting in few positive deficit shocks 
and few mid-year budget cuts.  Observations from this period thus couple minimal usable 
variation in our fiscal variable with substantial variation in our outcome variables.
18
  We 
present robustness checks showing that our point estimates change little when we include 
these years, but that our standard errors become larger.   
The data in Table 3 are broken down across annually- and biennially-budgeting 
states.  Since the summary statistics look broadly similar across the two groups, we do 
not worry that our focus on annually-budgeting states limits the applicability of our 
results.  In our sample, per capita general fund spending by state governments was on 
average around $1,680 in annually-budgeting states.   
Recall Figures 1 and 2, which illustrate the relationship between de-trended 
personal income and de-trended state spending outside of safety net programs and 
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 Those interested in a detailed look at the differences between BEA’s personal income and GDP measures 
should see Table 1.7.5 from the National Income and Product Accounts.  The main differences relate to 
cross-border income payments and capital depreciation. 
18
 This choice is also driven by the fact that our fiscal variable (the reported mid-year budget cuts) is 
effectively right-censored.  That is, NASBO does not report mid-year budget increases.  Reuben (1997?) 
investigated this issue and found it to have no impact on analyses of the deficit shocks associated with the 
1992 recession. 
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insurance trusts.  The pro-cyclicality of such spending is clear. These figures cover the 
relatively long time horizon available using data from the Census of Governments.  
Figure 4 focuses on the data available through NASBO over the time period for which we 
can construct the required measure of deficit shocks.  In this series as well, the pro-
cyclicality of state government spending remains starkly apparent.
19
  Figure 5 shows that 
mid-year spending cuts tend to occur at the start of recessions; just as personal income 
begins to fall off, spending cuts rise.  Spending cuts in the worst hit states during the 
worst years are about 4% of general fund spending, or about $200 per capita.   
Table 4 compares summary statistics across weak- and strong-rules states.  Again, 
the demographic characteristics look broadly similar.  The exception is that the weak-rule 
states tend to be larger, and wealthier.  As discussed above, cross-state differences are not 
an identification concern in and of themselves because we control flexibly for state fixed 
effects and trends.  We also experiment with including an interaction between income 
and deficit shocks as a control variable; it has a modest impact on our results. 
Two notable differences arise in comparing fiscal variables across states, one of 
which threatens our identification strategy while the other does not.  State government 
budgets are larger in weak-rule states than in strong-rule states.  This may appear to 
threaten our identification strategy.  Expressed as shares of state income, however, the 
governments in weak- and strong-rule states are of the same size.  All else equal, 
economic shocks of a given size will thus result in similarly sized deficit shocks.   
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 More specifically, the figures plot the residuals of income and general fund expenditures from 
regressions which include state fixed effects and quadratic state trends. 
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Differences in state revenue bases raise a genuine concern, as revenue bases with 
different elasticities (with respect to income) can lead a given economic shock to result in 
deficit shocks that differ across states.  Weak-rule states make moderately, but 
systematically, greater use of taxation than strong-rule states.  Specifically, taxation 
accounts for 51 percent of general revenues in weak-rule states and 45 percent in strict-
rule states, with personal income tax revenue accounting for almost the entire difference.  
Strict-rule states make up this difference through a combination of charges, fees, 
intergovernmental transfers, and other miscellaneous revenues.  This raises concern 
because personal income taxes tend to be more volatile than other revenue sources. 
A variety of issues complicate direct estimation of differences in the volatility of 
revenue sources across states.  One set of complications arises from the mid-year 
adjustments of rates and fees made by states to counteract shocks as they occur.  These 
changes must be netted out in order to obtain a true estimate of a tax base’s volatility.  
Another is driven by the fact that personal income taxes themselves can vary significantly 
across both time and space in key features like the extent of progressivity.  States that 
utilize relatively volatile tax bases may compensate by designing the relevant taxes to 
reduce the volatility of collections.  They may also make their non safety-net spending 
programs more volatile so that revenues and expenditures adjust together with the state of 
the economy, yielding no net difference in the implied deficit shocks. 
Table 5 presents estimates of the volatility of revenues and expenditures with a 
breakdown between weak- and strong-rule states.  The coefficients show the relationship 
between a change in personal income and changes in revenues and expenditures.  These 
changes are expressed in logs in Panel A and in levels in Panel B.  The measures of 
 22 
general fund revenues and expenditures have been adjusted to net out states’ mid-year tax 
and expenditure changes.  As one might expect, given their greater use of personal 
income taxes, revenue appears to be more volatile in weak-rule states.  However, 
expenditures are also relatively volatile in weak-rule states, implying that the difference 
in the volatility of deficits is less than the difference in the volatility of revenues.  
Expressed in logs, the difference continues to imply greater volatility in weak-rule states.  
Expressed in levels, however, the difference nets out to exactly zero.   
The pro-cyclicality of expenditures is driven in part by balanced budget 
requirements.  To the extent that revenue changes are anticipated, planned expenditures 
must be adjusted in order for a state to submit a balanced budget.  All else equal, 
however, this would lead one to expect greater volatility in the expenditures of states with 
strict budget rules.  As a test for differences in the volatility of state budgets, the evidence 
in Table 5 is not clean.  This is because states’ mid-year actions, driven by differences in 
their balanced budget requirements, are a determinant of personal income.  The absence 
of a clean test relates to the fact that one cannot, in general, directly test the exclusion 
restriction associated with an instrumental variables framework.  We cannot rule out the 
possibility that our estimates biased upward by weak-rule states’ choice of relatively 
volatile tax bases, but the volatility of their expenditures appears to mitigate this concern.  
5. Results 
First stage and baseline 
Table 6 presents our first stage results.  The specifications incorporate year 
effects, cycle-specific state effects, and cycle-specific state trends.   Columns marked 
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“Poterba sample” only use data from 1988-1992.  The “extended sample” includes 1988-
1994, and 2001-2004.  The results show that Poterba’s findings are not sensitive to 
extending the sample.  They show that for each dollar of deficit shock, strong-rule states 
tend to enact around $0.47 in mid-year budget cuts.  States without strong rules tend to 
cut between $0.33 and $0.40 less than strong-rule states (depending on the sample and 
the classification of rules used in the regression), for net cuts ranging from $0.07 to $0.14 
per dollar of deficit shock.  Results in Appendix Table A1 show that, as also found by 
Poterba (1994), budget rules are unrelated to state responses to deficit shocks along the 
tax margin.
20
  
The first stage partial F-statistic on the instruments is 10.89 using the weak/strong 
classification, and 12.01 using the weak/medium/strong classification.  Our instruments 
thus satisfy the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb calling for an F-statistic greater 
than 10, and there is little concern that our two-stage least squares (2SLS) coefficient 
estimates will be significantly biased.  Nonetheless, Stock and Yogo (2004) present 
evidence suggesting that 2SLS estimates of standard errors can suffer from significant 
downward bias even in the presence of moderately strong instruments, potentially leading 
to flawed statistical inference.   Their results show that standard error estimates using 
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) are much less sensitive to such 
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 Table A1 presents results similar to those in the first columns of Table 4 from Poterba’s 1994 paper, 
which do not use fixed effects, time effects, or trends.  The results using the 1988-1992 sample come quite 
close to replicating Poterba’s work even with our adjustment to the threshold for distinguishing between 
strong- and weak-rule states.  Poterba describes the construction of the ∆TAX and ∆TAXNEXT variables, 
which capture state response to fiscal crises on the revenue side of the ledger in the current and next fiscal 
year.  For our purposes, what is important to note is that while our instruments do explain a significant 
amount of the variation in outlays, they do not explain variation in tax revenues; the difference between the 
responses of weak- and strong-rule states to fiscal shocks occurs in terms of spending, not taxes.  
Consequently we do not worry that tax changes correlated with the outlay adjustments picked up by our 
instrument are a source of bias in our results.  In our IV specifications, conditioning on these tax changes 
does not affect the results. 
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problems.
21
  Consequently we present our preferred specifications using both 2SLS and 
LIML to demonstrate that the LIML standard error estimates differ little from the 2SLS 
standard error estimates.  
 Table 7 presents results which provide a sense for how the mid-year cuts driven 
by strong budget rules play out in state budgets.  The expenditure results confirm that a 
when weak-rule states cut a dollar less in spending (per dollar of deficit shock), they 
spend about one dollar more than strong-rule states across the budget.  As would be 
expected, this number increases moderately (to about 1.2) if public welfare expenditures 
are excluded (result not shown).  In the following year, weak- and strong-rule states have 
roughly equalized their expenditures, and two years out the weak-rule states make up 
their deficits by spending somewhat more than one dollar less than strong-rule states.  
The revenue results suggest that there is no separation between weak- and strong-rule 
states in the year of the shock, that weak-rule states collect about 70 cents less in 
revenues in the year after the shock, and that collections are again comparable two years 
out.  Over the course of the three years, the implied difference in deficits nets out to 
almost exactly zero.  While imprecision is a problem throughout, the point estimates 
match quite closely with received wisdom regarding the effects of weak and strong 
budget rules.  Weak-rule states bring their spending in line with strong-rule states in the 
year following the shock and they make up their deficits shortly thereafter.  The results 
support the interpretation that the estimated effects of mid-year budget cuts will reflect 
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 See Tables 1, 2, and 4 from Stock and Yogo (2004).  Table 2 implies that in cases involving 1 
endogenous regressor and 2 or 4 instruments (corresponding, respectively, to our specifications involving 
the weak/strong and weak/medium/strong classifications) our F-statistics leave open the possibility of 
substantial downward bias in our standard error estimates when using 2SLS.  Table 4, on the other hand, 
implies that we have little reason to worry about downwardly biased standard errors when using LIML.   
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the effects of shifts in the timing of expenditures rather than an increase in total 
expenditures over the course of the business cycle. 
Table 8 presents our baseline specifications.  Our baseline multiplier estimates on 
personal income are around 1.7 whether we instrument using the weak/medium/strong 
classification or the weak/strong classification.  We invert the coefficient on employment 
to produce an estimate of dollars per job “preserved” or “created.”  Using both budget 
rule classification systems, the implied cost is about $25,000.  The multiplier estimates 
are not very precise.  This lack of precision is due to the fact that variation in income is 
large relative to the variation in ∆Outlays.  The employment estimates are somewhat 
more precise, presumably because there is less volatility in employment than in income.  
For the dollars-per-job metric, we use the delta method to obtain a standard error slightly 
larger than $11,000 and a 95% confidence interval bounded by $3,100 to $46,400.  
Comparing the results in Panel A to the results in Panel B, one can see that neither the 
coefficient estimates nor the standard errors change substantially when we use LIML 
rather than 2SLS.   
In Table 9 we attempt to decompose the employment and income results across 
the public and private sectors.  We first estimate the impact of mid-year budget cuts on 
government employment and government wages and salaries.  Then we estimate impacts 
on aggregate employment net of government employment and aggregative income net of 
government wages and salaries.
22
  We do this using two sources of information on 
                                                        
22
 Personal income and wages and salaries are not directly comparable, although wages and salaries is the 
largest component of personal income.  Similar results could be obtained by showing a breakdown of total 
wages and salaries into its private and public components.  We show results for personal income net of 
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government employment and wages.  These include a) the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages’ (QCEW) breakdown of firms by ownership, which includes 
private and various levels of government, and b) the Census Bureau’s annual report of the 
employment and wages of state government employees.   
The results from both sources suggest that little of our observed employment 
effect comes through government employment (see columns 2 and 3 of Panel A).  Mid-
year budget cuts do appear to come in the form of lower wages for government 
employees.  However, our sources disagree on the extent to which this is the case.  The 
results in columns 2 and 3 of Panel B imply that for each extra dollar that a state 
government spends (or dollar of rescissions that it avoids), it will tend to spend either 
$0.14 (QCEW) or $0.46 (Census of Governments) on wages and salaries for government 
employees.  The results are not precisely estimated in either case.  Taken at face value, 
they imply that most of these dollars are spent in the form of capital expenditures and 
other purchases of services and equipment which flow through privately owned firms. 
Robustness checks 
We have run a variety of specification checks to explore the sensitivity of our 
results.  We discuss two sets of regressions for which we also present tables, after which 
we provide a qualitative assessment of our additional checks.  The results presented 
explicitly involve relaxation of our sample inclusion criteria.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
government wages and salaries because personal income (as opposed to wages and salaries) is the variable 
of interest in our main specifications.  
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Table 11 presents results in which we significantly expand the sample of states.  
Using information provided by GAO (1993), we can divide the set of biennial budgeting 
states into those with annual and biennial legislative cycles.  Though they are excluded in 
Poterba’s work on state responses to deficit shocks,  as well as from our main results, the 
states with annual legislative cycles are plausibly comparable to those with annual budget 
cycles (both in terms of their behavior and their data reporting).  The results in Table 11 
involve re-running the specifications from Panel A of Table 7 with the inclusion of this 
additional set of states.   Among this set of states, Wyoming and Vermont may be viewed 
as outliers: Wyoming due to its reliance on natural gas and intergovernmental revenues 
and Vermont due to its standing as the only state without a formal balanced budget 
requirement of any kind.
23
  Consequently, we report two sets of results.  In Panel A we 
report results excluding Wyoming and Vermont from the set of additional states.  In 
Panel B we report results with their inclusion.  Both the employment and personal 
income results in Panel A are quite similar to our baseline results (the personal income 
multiplier is around 1.8 and the employment coefficients are 0.000038 and 0.000039).  
Adding Wyoming and Vermont to the sample has almost no effect on the personal 
income results, but pushes the employment coefficient down to 0.000025, implying that 
around $40,000 in rescissions must be avoided to generate a job.   
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 While a typical U.S. state relies on intergovernmental revenues for about 25% of total revenues and on 
traditional tax bases (i.e., sales, individual income, and corporate income) for close to 2/3 of its total 
revenues, Wyoming relies on intergovernmental revenues for nearly 40% of total revenues and on 
traditional tax bases for only 11% of total revenues.  It relies much more heavily on “other taxes,” charges, 
and miscellaneous revenues, with these accounting for nearly 30% of total revenues relative to 15% in the 
average state.  Wyoming’s state government is also much larger than the typical state government, with 
total revenues amounting to $10,200 per capita in 2004 relative to $5,400 for the average state. 
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In Table 12 we bring the 1995-2000 period into the sample.  This period has 
previously been excluded since it constitutes a boom during which there is little variation 
in our fiscal variables.  As expected, the inclusion of these observations results in an 
increase in our standard errors (by on the order of 20-30%).  The point estimates change 
very little, however, with estimated personal income multipliers of 1.55 and 1.59 and 
employment coefficients of 0.000035 and 0.000046. 
In unreported regressions we have inspected sensitivity to several additional 
forms of specification changes.  These include the addition of potentially relevant 
controls, alteration of the manner in which the instruments are specified, and adjustments 
to the manner in which the fixed effects and trends are specified.   
We have controlled for factors including the fraction of the population in the labor 
force, economic shocks due to shifts in the national industry mix (see, e.g., Bartike, 1991 
and Blanchard and Katz, 1992), and the amount of federal grant dollars flowing into each 
state.  These controls have essentially no effect on the results.  We have also controlled 
for interactions between deficit shocks and state income (due to the concern that the 
relatively wealthy weak-rule states may respond differently to deficit shocks through 
channels related to income).  This moderately reduces the multiplier estimate to 1.4. 
Altering the specification of the instruments has essentially no effect on our 
results.  Specifically, since budget rules only bind when deficit shocks are positive, the 
interaction between budget rules and negative deficit shocks is superfluous to the 
identification strategy.  Dropping these instruments yields first-stage F-statistics close to 
20 and has essentially no impact on either the income or employment estimates. 
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Specification sensitivity emerges when we consider adjustments to the manner in 
which we specify fixed effects and trends.  We have experimented with a variety of 
specifications involving replacement of our cycle-specific state effects with state effects 
and our cycle-specific state trends with linear, quadratic, or cubic state trends.  
Specifications that look most like our baseline specifications (e.g., cycle-specific state 
effects and quadratic state trends) yield results almost identical to our baseline results.  
Other specifications yield results which can be either substantially higher or lower than 
our baseline estimates.  In this context, our results emerge as what they are, namely the 
central tendency of a modestly powered analysis.   
Our baseline specifications are our preferred specifications for three reasons.  
First, they are, roughly speaking, the central tendency of this battery of specification 
checks.  Second, they are more precisely estimated than specifications with sparser sets 
of fixed effects and trends.  Third, as shown in Table 8 they map consistently into 
aggregate budget data; a dollar in spending cuts predicts a dollar less in aggregate 
expenditures and weak-rule states adjust their budgets to pay down deficits over a short 
time horizon.   
6. Conclusion 
We have exploited plausibly exogenous variation in state budget cuts in an 
attempt to identify parameters of interest for evaluating counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
Our estimates apply to mid-year budget cuts which effectively shift the timing of 
government spending over the course of the business cycle.  This makes them relevant 
for assessing the welfare effects of smoothing the flow of state expenditures on goods, 
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services, and infrastructure.  A complete smoothing of such expenditures could yield 
large welfare gains.  We find that state spending tends to be 9 cents below trend for each 
$1 that personal income falls below its trend.  If states kept their spending on trend, our 
multiplier estimate implies that income would be $0.09 x 1.7 ≈ $0.15 closer to trend. 
Smoothing state expenditures could thus reduce the amplitude of state business cycles by 
about 15 percent. 
Estimates of the welfare costs of business cycles vary widely within the literature.  
Seminal work by Lucas (1987) arrived at a very small estimates of these costs, while 
more recent work (e.g., Krusell et al, 2009, and  Chauvin, Laibson, and Mollerstrom 
2009), has arrived at estimates equal to or in excess of 1 percent of all future 
consumption.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine precisely how state 
government spending feeds into the mechanisms associated with the welfare costs 
highlighted in past work (e.g., the asset bubbles studied by Chauvin, Laibson, and 
Mollerstrom).  If business cycles are as costly as this work finds, the welfare gain from 
eliminating the contribution made by state governments could reach 0.5 percent of future 
consumption.   
Our estimates suggest that $1 in mid-year budget cuts reduces state income in that 
year by around $1.70 and that $25,000 in cuts result in the loss of a job.  To the extent 
that federal aid to states prevents budget cuts of a similar nature, we would expect this aid 
to have similar effects on state economies.  For federal aid to replicate the natural 
experiment we study, however, it would need to take the form of a loan to be repaid 
during better economic times.  Such a loan would generate the required shift away from 
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pro-cyclical expenditures rather than leading to higher total spending over the business 
cycle.
24
   
In evaluating the policy implications of our results, one should consider potential 
differences between the effects of state and federal stabilization policy.  On this topic, 
Gramlich (1987) notes that state stabilization policy may, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, have greater impact than federal stabilization policy.  He points out that since 
labor is fairly immobile in the short run, and since services and non-tradables comprise a 
large share of Gross State Product (GSP), factor and consumption leakages do not pose 
serious threats to state stabilization policy.  He also notes that state stabilization policies 
will be less offset than federal policy by feedback through the exchange rate (sometimes 
known as a Mundell-Fleming effect).
25
  Ultimately, the relationship between multipliers 
on state spending and federal spending is a priori ambiguous.  Cross-state leakages 
suggest that state multipliers will be smaller; but factor mobility and Mundell-Fleming 
effects could push in the other direction. 
One should also note the important differences between the spending cuts we 
study and the spending often associated with fiscal stimulus.  These cuts apply to 
previously existing programs that were presumably better planned than hastily organized 
stimulus projects which must quickly squeeze through administrative bottlenecks.  
Additionally, other spending which gets tagged as “stimulus spending” might more 
accurately be called “safety-net spending” and may have very different effects, in 
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 Additionally, the possibility of federal grants to debt-laden states creates a source of moral hazard which 
may impact other aspects of state fiscal behavior. 
25
 This argument naturally requires that states’ policies are not perfectly correlated in a cross-section. 
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particular with regards to employment.  Spending through UI and cash welfare will 
contribute to income in the form of transfer payments and may “stimulate” when targeted 
at individuals with high marginal propensities to consume, but may actually reduce 
employment due to their effects on incentives for job search.  These considerations 
highlight the need for fiscal policy research to focus on key differences between broad 
fiscal policy categories even while trying to maintain a degree of generality. 
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Note: Figure 1 plots the unweighted means (across states) of de-trended personal income and state government spending outside of 
insurance trusts and safety-net programs on a per capita basis.  Detrending was conducted using state-specific quartic polynomials.  
Personal income data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and state government spending data come from the Census 
of Governments (COG). 
 
 
Figure 2 plots state-year observations of de-trended personal income and state government spending outside of insurance trusts and 
safety-net programs on a per capita basis.  The best-fit line has a slope of 0.089 (standard error of 0.014) and the regression yields an 
r-squared of 0.22.  Detrending was conducted using state-specific quartic polynomials.  Personal income data come from the BEA and 
state government spending data come from the COG. 
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Note: Figure 3 graphs deficit shocks per capita  and de-trended personal income per capita.  The deficit shocks were constructed using 
data from semi-annual reports by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO).  Personal income data come from the 
BEA.   
 
 
Note: Figure 4 graphs personal income and general fund expenditures per capita, de-trended and averaged across states.  Personal 
income data come from the BEA.  State general fund expenditures come from NASBO's semi-annual reports. 
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Note: Figure 5 graphs annual means (across states) of mid-year budget cuts (taken from NASBO's semi-annual reports) and de-trended 
personal income per capita.   
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Table 1 
Deficit Shocks and Changes in Per Capita Personal Income 
  
ΔPersonal 
Income 
ΔPersonal 
Income 
ΔPersonal 
Income 
ΔPersonal 
Income 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} -2.006*** -1.051** -1.669*** -0.981 
 
(0.32) (0.42) (0.56) (0.59) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} -0.519 -0.131 -0.245 0.127 
 
(0.54) (0.42) (0.59) (0.53) 
Cycle Specific State Effects? No No Yes Yes 
Year Effects? No Yes No Yes 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.  Deficit shocks 
were constructed using data from the National Association of State Budget Officer’s (NASBO) Fiscal Survey 
of the States series.  Changes in state level personal income were calculated using data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), and were calculated on a state fiscal year basis.  Both series are in terms of real 
2004 dollars per capita.  The sample includes observations from 27 of the 29 states documented as having 
annual budget cycles by NASBO.  Massachusetts and Alaska were excluded due to their status as fiscal 
outliers.  The sample covers the years 1988-2004.  Several additional observations are unavailable due to 
incomplete data reporting, leaving a final sample of 448 observations. 
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Table 2 
Rules Classification: Weak/Medium/Strong  
   Weak Rules Medium Rules Strong Rules 
CONNECTICUT CALIFORNIA ALABAMA 
ILLINOIS MARYLAND ARIZONA 
LOUISIANA MICHIGAN COLORADO 
NEW YORK PENNSYLVANIA DELAWARE 
  
GEORGIA 
  
IDAHO 
  
IOWA 
  
KANSAS 
  
MISSISSIPPI 
  
MISSOURI 
  
NEW JERSEY 
  
NEW MEXICO 
  
OKLAHOMA 
  
RHODE ISLAND 
  
SOUTH CAROLINA 
  
SOUTH DAKOTA 
  
TENNESSEE 
  
UTAH 
    WEST VIRGINIA 
Note: The table contains a classification of the 27 states with annual budget cycles that are 
included in our final sample as described in the note to Table 1.  States were ranked according to a 
stringency index found in Table 3 of ACIR (1987).  States with an index value less than 5 are 
classified as weak, an index equal to 6 as medium, and an index exceeding 6 as strong.  When we 
classify states as strong or weak, the states classified as medium are shifted into the weak 
classification.  In Table 11, we expand the sample by 11 additional states which, although they 
have biennial budgeting cycles, have annual legislative cycles. 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics: Annual Vs. Biennial Budgeting States 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Annual 
 
Biennial 
Demographic Variables 
       State Population 5759126 6441555 
 
4526764 4691658 
  Drop Out Fraction 0.18 0.043 
 
0.166 0.04 
  High School Grad Fraction 0.274 0.034 
 
0.282 0.033 
  Some College Fraction* 0.174 0.036 
 
0.186 0.041 
  College Plus Fraction 0.152 0.038 
 
0.151 0.033 
  Medicaid Fraction 0.103 0.035 
 
0.091 0.031 
  Senior Fraction 0.122 0.018 
 
0.121 0.018 
  Child Fraction 0.278 0.032 
 
0.272 0.025 
      Economic Variables 
       Personal Income ($ per capita) 28460 5509 
 
28132 3681 
  Employment per capita* 0.423 0.039 
 
0.438 0.037 
  Bartik Shock 0.018 0.016 
 
0.019 0.023 
      Fiscal Variables ($ per capita) 
       State General Fund Expenditures 1679 572 
 
1579 559 
  State General Fund Revenues 1674 569 
 
1564 548 
  DEFSHOCK 17.9 101.3 
 
6.6 120.8 
  ∆TAX 2.8 12.8 
 
4.1 15.3 
  ∆TAXNEXT (next fiscal year) 22.5 62.9 
 
21.1 57.8 
  ∆OUTLAYS -19.1 33.8 
 
-21.2 38.5 
Observations 288 
 
230 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences between the means for annual and biennial budgeting states at 
the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.  The 288 observations for annual states correspond to the sample initially described in 
the note to Table 1.  The 230 observations for biennial states include all observations for the 21 biennial budgeting states (as 
categorized by NASBO) for which the data required to construct the deficit shock measure are available in the years 1988-1994 
and 2001-2004.  State population and personal income data come from BEA.  Other demographic variables were estimated 
using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).  Employment data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The 
employment data were also used to construct the Bartik Shock variable, which is  described in detail by Bartik (1991) and 
Blanchard and Katz (1992).  All fiscal variables are either taken directly from, or calculated by the authors using, data in 
various issues of NASBO’s Fiscal Survey of the States, and are expressed in real 2004 dollars per capita. 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics: Strict vs. Weak Budget Rules States 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Strict 
 
Weak 
Demographic Variables 
       State Population* 3235591 2060689 
 
12000000 8911843 
  Drop Out Fraction 0.18 0.05 
 
0.18 0.03 
  High School Grad Fraction 0.27 0.03 
 
0.28 0.04 
  Some College Fraction 0.18 0.04 
 
0.17 0.03 
  College Plus Fraction* 0.15 0.04 
 
0.17 0.04 
  Medicaid Fraction 0.10 0.04 
 
0.11 0.03 
  Senior Fraction 0.12 0.02 
 
0.12 0.02 
  Child Fraction 0.28 0.03 
 
0.27 0.02 
      Economic Variables 
       Personal Income ($ per capita)*** 26816 4644 
 
32519 5397 
  Employment per capita 0.42 0.04 
 
0.43 0.03 
  Bartik Shock Growth 0.02 0.02 
 
0.02 0.02 
      Fiscal Variables ($ per capita) 
       State General Fund Expenditures 1584 512 
 
1912 645 
  State General Fund Revenues 1585 512 
 
1896 641 
  DEFSHOCK 10 97 
 
36 110 
TAX 2 13 
 
5 13 
TAXNEXT (next fiscal year) 20 56 
 
28 77 
  Total Taxes as Share of Gen. Rev.  0.45 0.05 
 
0.51 0.07 
  Pers. Inc. Taxes as Share of Gen. Rev.  0.14 0.07 
 
0.19 0.05 
  Corp. Inc. Taxes as Share of Gen. Rev. 0.02 0.01 
 
0.03 0.01 
  Sales Taxes as Share of Gen. Rev.  0.23 0.06 
 
0.23 0.04 
  Intergov. as Share of Gen. Rev. 0.35 0.06 
 
0.32 0.06 
OUTLAYS -20 37 
 
-17 25 
Observations 83 
 
205 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences between the means for weak- and strong-budget rule 
states at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.  The combined sample of 288 observations was determined as 
initially described in the note to Table 1.  Data sources for variables that also appear in Table 3 are as described in 
the note to that table.  The additional fiscal variables, which describe various revenue sources as shares of total 
general revenues were taken from the 2004 Census of Government's Annual Survey of State and Local Government 
Finances. 
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Table 5 
Cyclicality of General Fund Revenues and Expenditures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
All States 
Strong-Rule 
States 
Weak-Rule 
States 
All States 
Strong-Rule 
States 
Weak-Rule 
States 
Panel A: logs 
      
 
Change in constant law ln(General Revenues)   Change in constant law ln(General Expenditures)  
Change in ln(Personal Income) 0.606*** 0.533*** 0.772*** 0.999*** 0.962*** 1.084*** 
 
(0.140) (0.182) (0.187) (0.151) (0.194) (0.217) 
Observations 426 304 122 426 304 122 
       Panel B: levels 
      
 
Change in constant law General Revenues  Change in constant law General Expenditures  
Change in Personal Income 0.029*** 0.021 0.043*** 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 426 304 122 426 304 122 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are 
in parentheses beneath each point estimate.  In column 1 the sample consists of observations for the 27 annually budgeting states listed in Table 2.  In column 2 the sample is 
restricted to states designated as having strong budget rules.  In column 3 the sample contains states with either weak or meadium budget rules.  The measure of general fund 
revenues was constructed by taking NASBO's reports of actual general fund revenues and adding back the measure of mid-year tax changes that can be cconstructed using data 
on tax changes that are also included in the NASBO reports.  
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Table 6 
First Stage Regressions: Baseline Specification 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
Poterba Sample Extended Sample 
 
Poterba Sample Extended Sample 
Weak Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 0.346*** 0.401*** 
 
0.383*** 0.386*** 
 
(0.081) (0.10) 
 
(0.082) (0.057) 
Weak Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} -0.103* -0.148 
 
-0.102* -0.106 
 
(0.051) (0.11) 
 
(0.051) (0.11) 
Medium Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 
   
0.334*** 0.404** 
    
(0.082) (0.15) 
Medium Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} 
   
-0.100 -0.159 
    
(0.10) (0.11) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} -0.478*** -0.473*** 
 
-0.476*** -0.470*** 
 
(0.057) (0.049) 
 
(0.058) (0.048) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} 0.0422 0.0682 
 
0.0352 0.0525 
 
(0.048) (0.091) 
 
(0.049) (0.092) 
Cycle Specific State Effects? Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Cycle Specific State Trends? Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 129 288 
 
129 288 
R-squared 0.69 0.76   0.69 0.76 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in 
parentheses beneath each point estimate.  In all columns, the sample contains 27 annual budgeting states as first described in the note to Table 1.  In columns 1 and 3, the years of the 
sample are 1988-1992, roughly replicating the sample used by Poterba (1994), but with two additional observations missing due to incomplete or questionable data.  In columns 2 and 4 
the sample includes data from 1988-1994 and from 2001-2004.  Cycle specific state effects means that there are two dummy variables included for each state, one equal to 1 for the years 
1988-1994 and the other equal to 1 for the years 2001-2004.  Similarly, cycle specific state trends mean that each state has two trend variables, one set equal to 1 in 1988 and rising to 7 in 
1994, but equal to 0 thereafter, and one equal to 0 prior to 2001, then equal to 1 in 2001 and rising to 4 in 2004.  In columns 3 and 4, the states are categorized according to their budget 
rules as listed in Table 2.  In columns 1 and 2, both the weak and medium rule states from Table 2 are categorized as weak-rule states. 
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Table 7 
Relationship between Mid-Year Budget Cuts and the Evolution of 
Total Revenues and Expenditures 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) 
 
Expenditures 
 
Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 
∆OUTLAYS (year t) 1.036 0.008 -1.717 
 
(0.642) (1.121) (0.816) 
    Panel B 
   
 
Revenues 
 
Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 
∆OUTLAYS (year t) -0.226 -0.728 -0.052 
 
(0.587) (0.860) (0.398) 
    Observations 288 288 288 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels 
respectively.  This table contains results from the second stages of IV regressions of state 
government expenditures and revenues on mid-year budget cuts.  The sample is as described 
in the note to Table 1.  Expenditures are constructed as the sum of real per capita current and 
capital expenditures from the Census of Governments.  Revenues are constructed as real per 
capita general revenues from the Census of Governments. 
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Table 8 
Baseline Second Stage Specifications 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A 2SLS 
 
Personal 
Income 
Employment 
Personal 
Income 
Employment 
∆OUTLAYS 1.758* 0.0000402** 1.681* 0.0000404** 
 
(0.91) (0.000019) (0.93) (0.000018) 
     DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 1.106*** 0.00000653 1.084*** 0.00000657 
 
(0.37) (0.0000044) (0.38) (0.0000041) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} -0.0594 0.00000709 -0.0565 0.00000708 
 
(0.31) (0.0000064) (0.31) (0.0000064) 
     Panel B LIML 
 
Personal 
Income 
Employment 
Personal 
Income 
Employment 
∆OUTLAYS 1.763* 0.0000408** 1.682* 0.0000406** 
 
(0.91) (0.000019) (0.93) (0.000018) 
     DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 1.108*** 0.00000668 1.084*** 0.00000664 
 
(0.37) (0.0000045) (0.38) (0.0000042) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} -0.0596 0.00000707 -0.0565 0.00000707 
 
(0.31) (0.0000064) (0.31) (0.0000064) 
     
Excluced Instruments 
Medium and Weak Budget 
Rules*DEFSHOCK (above 
and below zero)  
Weak Budget 
Rules*DEFSHOCK (above 
and below zero) 
Cycle Specific State Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cyle Specific State Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 288 288 288 288 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively. This table contains results from the 
second stages of IV regressions of personal income and employment on mid-year budget cuts.  The sample is as described in the 
note to Table 1.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath each 
point estimate.  Results in Panel A were estimated using the Two-Stage-Least-Squares procedure while results in Panel B were 
estimated using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood.  Fixed effects and trends are as described in the note to Table 6.  The 
excluded instruments in columns 1 and 2 correspond to the 4 interaction variables used in columns 3 and 4 of the regressions 
presented in Table 6.  The excluded instruments in columns 3 and 4 correspond to the 2 interaction variables used in columns 3 and 
4 of the regressions presented in Table 6.  The partial F-statistic on the excluded instrument exceeds 10 in all specifications. 
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Table 9 
Employment and Personal Income/Wages by Public and Private 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A 
   
 
Total Employment 
Government 
Employment (QCEW) 
Government 
Employment (Census of 
Govs.) 
∆OUTLAYS 0.0000404** 0.0000020 0.000000922 
 
(0.000018) (0.0000046) (0.0000027) 
        
Panel B 
   
 
Total Personal Income 
Gov. Wages and 
Salaries (QCEW) 
State Gov. Wages and 
Salaries (Census of 
Govs.) 
∆OUTLAYS 1.681* 0.136 0.461 
 
(0.93) (0.204) (0.49) 
        
Panel C 
   
 
Private Employment 
(QCEW) 
Personal Income net of 
Gov. Wages and 
Salaries (QCEW) 
Personal Income net of 
State Gov. Wages and 
Salaries (Census of 
Govs.) 
∆OUTLAYS 0.0000384** 1.546* 1.220 
 
(0.000017) (0.93) (1.18) 
    Excluded Instruments Weak Budget Rules * DEFSHOCK * 1{DEFSHOCK above and below 0} 
Cycle Specific State Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Cyle Specific State Trends? Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for 
arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath each point estimate.  Specifications take the same form as the specifications 
from columns 3 and 4 of Panel A in Table 7.  In Column 2 the dependent variable in Panel A is total government employment as taken from 
BLS's Establishment Survey and the dependent variable in Panel B is total government wages and salaries as taken from the same source.  In 
Column 3 the dependent variable in Panel A is total state government employment as taken from the Employment section of the annual survey 
of state governments taken by the Census Bureau, and the dependent variable in Panel B is the wages and salaries total as taken from the same 
source.  Panel three shows results from specifications in which government employment or wages and salaries are subtracted from the relevant 
sum of private and public income or employment, with the sources as indicated in the table.    
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Table 10 
Robustness to Inclusion of Additional States with Annual Legislative Cycles 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Personal 
Income 
Employment 
Personal 
Income 
Employment 
∆OUTLAYS 1.831* 0.0000380** 1.835* 0.0000391*** 
 
(1.01) (0.000015) (1.07) (0.000015) 
Observations 407 407 407 407 
Panel B         
∆OUTLAYS 1.874* 0.0000249 1.874* 0.0000247 
 
(0.98) (0.000018) (1.01) (0.000018) 
Instruments 
Medium and Weak Budget 
Rules*DEFSHOCK (above 
and below zero)  
Weak Budget 
Rules*DEFSHOCK (above 
and below zero) 
Cycle Specific State Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cyle Specific State Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 429 429 429 429 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively. This table contains results from the 
second stages of IV regressions of personal income and employment on mid-year budget cuts.  Standard errors, calculated 
allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath each point estimate.  Specifications in Panel A 
correspond to those in Panel A of Table 7, but with the addition of 11 states that have biennial budget cycles and annual 
legislative cycles.  These states are: Florida, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio, Virginia, Washington, 
Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Hawaii.  Among these additional states, Wisconsin and New Hampshire qualify as weak-rule states and 
the remainder as strong-rule states.  Specifications in Panel B add Vermont (weak rules) and Wyoming (strong rules)  to the 
sample used in Panel A.  These states are added with caution due to their atypical fiscal traits, which are described in the text.   
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Table 11 
Robustness to Inclusion of the 1995-2000 Boom 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Personal 
Income 
Employment 
Personal 
Income 
Employment 
∆OUTLAYS 1.554 0.0000353* 1.592 0.0000463** 
 
(1.17) (0.000021) (1.34) (0.000023) 
     
Instruments 
Medium and Weak Budget 
Rules*DEFSHOCK (above 
and below zero)  
Weak Budget 
Rules*DEFSHOCK (above 
and below zero) 
Cycle Specific State Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cyle Specific State Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 448 448 448 448 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively. This table contains results from the 
second stages of IV regressions of personal income and employment on mid-year budget cuts.  The sample is as described in the 
note to Table 1.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath each 
point estimate.  Specifications correspond to those in Panel A of Table 7, but with the addition of 11 states that have biennial 
budget cycles and annual legislative cycles.  These states are: Florida, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Hawaii.  Among these additional states, Wisconsin and New Hampshire qualify 
as weak-rule states and the remainder as strong-rule states. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Poterba Regressions with Balanced Budget Requirement Variables 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 
Poterba Sample 
 
Extended Sample 
 
∆OUTLAYS ∆TAX ∆TAXNEXT 
 
∆OUTLAYS ∆TAX ∆TAXNEXT 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} -0.454*** 0.120** 0.554** 
 
-0.416*** 0.0687** 0.240** 
 
(0.061) (0.044) (0.21) 
 
(0.034) (0.027) (0.10) 
DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK <=  0} -0.0358 0.0141 0.159 
 
-0.0350** 0.0233 0.118** 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.12) 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.050) 
Weak Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 0.274*** -0.0381 -0.138 
 
0.254*** -0.0131 0.0354 
 
(0.074) (0.047) (0.25) 
 
(0.052) (0.028) (0.14) 
Weak Rules*DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK < 0} 0.0300* -0.0120 -0.0177 
 
0.0179 -0.0269* 0.0210 
 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.10) 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.051) 
        Observations 129 129 129 
 
288 288 288 
R-squared 0.52 0.22 0.19   0.59 0.15 0.12 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.  Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses 
beneath each point estimate.  In all columns, the sample contains 27 annual budgeting states as first described in the note to Table 1.  In columns 1, 2, and 3, the years of the sample are 1988-
1992, roughly replicating the sample used by Poterba (1994), but with two additional observations missing due to incomplete or questionable data.  In columns 4, 5, and 6 the sample includes 
data from 1988-1994 and from 2001-2004.  ∆OUTLAYS represents the mid-year budget rescissions made by states in real per capita terms.  ∆TAXNEXT is the value of tax collections expected 
in the following fiscal year as a result of tax increases enacted during the current fiscal year.  ∆TAX is an estimate of the value of enacted tax increases in the current fiscal year.  Estimating 
∆TAX requires making use of the enactment dates provided by NASBO in the Fiscal Survey of the States series.  Like the specifications in Poterba (1994) these specifications include neither 
time effects nor state fixed effects. 
 
 
